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I. RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set forth in Respondent's 
Brief does not add anything to the Statement of Facts 
in Appellant's Brief which is material to this appeal. 
However, Respondent has included certain facts which 
are wholly immaterial. None of the facts referred 
to in Paragraph B, pages 6-9 of its Brief are per-
tinent • As admitted at page 9 of Respondent's Brief, 
these relate only to events transpiring on or after 
March 16, 1971, and to the liability of M-S Commodi-
ties and Maurie Schneider to Zions on the $38,505.08 
overdraft. 
II. THE COUNTERCLAIM JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF M-S 
COMMODITIES AGAINST ZIONS BANK SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE $25,000 WERE FUNDS 
BELONGING TO DAL-RON ENTERPRISES AND M-S 
COMMODITIES HAD NO INTEREST THEREIN, 
SUFFERED NO DAMAGE WITH RESPECT THERETO AND 
HAD NO STANDING TO MAINTAIN THE COUNTERCLAIM 
In its Brief (Point II, pages 26-31), Zions 
argues that the Counterclaim judgment against it in 
favor of M-S Commodities should be sustained, asserting 
before this court that there is "substantial evidence11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to support such judgment. This assertion is 
directly contrary to the characterization of the 
evidence made by Zions before the court below. At 
the close of M-S Commodities1 case-in-chief, Zions 
moved for judgment to dismiss the counterclaim for 
insufficient evidence, particularly on the grounds 
that M-S had failed to prove that the $25,000 was 
its money and that it therefore had no standing to 
sue (these being precisely the same arguments made 
by appellant in Point I of its Opening Brief). 
Mr. Greene:. . .On behalf of Zions First 
National Bank [we move] to dis-
miss the counterclaim of 
M-S Commodities, I believe 
that is the only defendant 
which seeks the counter-
claim. We think the evidence 
affirmatively shows that the 
money in question was not 
M-S Commodity money. They 
have no right to be asserting 
this counterclaim, among 
other reasons. (R. 1264; 
A.141.) 
Zions1 motive for adopting this inconsistent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1/ 
position is clearly stated in its Brief. It simply 
believes it will be easier to collect a judgment 
against Clark Tank Lines than from the parties (M-S 
Commodities, Inc., Maurie Schneider, J. Moroni Stoof 
and Dai-Ron Enterprises) against whom it was awarded 
judgments totaling over $38,500 on its complaint in 
this action. This consideration apparently out-
weighs any embarrassment it may feel about speaking 
from both sides of its corporate mouth in this matter. 
Respondent contends that it would be t!unconscionablefr 
1/ 
flReversal of the offset judgment in favor of M-S 
and against Zions would only increase the net uncollect-
ible judgment in favor of Zions against the defunct 
corporation M-S from the net of $13,505.08, but such 
would not restore the $25,000 which in fact was wrong-
fully diverted. Clark Tank Lines would thus retain 
the $25,000 which became a part of the $38,505.08 loss 
suffered by Zions First National Bank—which clearly 
would be an unequitable and unconscionable result." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 37. The Court should note 
that Respondent refers only to the judgment awarded 
to it against M-S Commodities and completely ignores 
the judgment also awarded to it against Schneider 
and Stoof, neither of whom (particularly Schneider) 
is "defunct".) 
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for Appellant to keep the $25,000 received by it in 
payment of a lawful debt, but that it is perfectly proper 
to have the money turned over to M-S Commodities even 
though, as the Trial Court found and as Respondent it-
self argued in the Court below, these funds never be-
longed to M-S but were at all times the property of 
Dal-Ron Enterprieses, who has never and does not here 
seek to recover them. 
In its Brief, Respondent totally ignores the Trial 
Court's express finding that the $25,000 which is the 
subject of M-S?s counterclaim belonged to Dal-Ron Enter-
prises. This finding was repeated at least four times 
by Judge Croft in the record. The Court's statements are 
quoted at pages 16 and 17 of Appellant's Opening Brief. 
Instead, Respondent's entire discussion of this 
point (Respondents' Brief, pp. 26-31) attempts to show 
that the evidence establishes that the funds belonged 
to M-S Commodities, thus challenging a factual finding 
_ _ 
Respondent admits that Appellant received 
the money in partial payment of a debt owed to it 
by Stoof. See Respondents' Brief, p. 12. 
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the Trial Court urged upon it by Respondent 
ring trial* Respondent's dilemna is obvious. 
the evidence supports the Trial Court's finding 
it the funds belonged to Dai-Ron Enterprises, the 
Lai Court committed clear error in awarding M-S 
imodities judgment for "damages" it patently did not 
fer. On the other hand, if the evidence shows that 
funds belonged to M-S Commodities, as Respondent 
claims, its remedy was to assign error to the 
rt's' factual finding by appealing the Counterclaim 
gment against it to this Court, which it has not 
1/ 
?.. To extricate itself, Respondent cleverly attacks 
Trial Court's factual finding under the guise of 
Respondent perhaps recognized that to assign 
or to a factual finding of the Trial Court which 
pondent itself argued for during trial would be con-
ry to the rule barring a party from claiming error 
:h it "invited" the trial judge to make or from 
Lng positions on appeal inconsistent with positions 
m before the lower court. See, e.g., Ludlow v. 
>rado Animal By-Products, Inc., 104 Utah 221, 137 
ntinued on following page.) 
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1/ 
(Continued) P. 2d 347, 354, (1943); Helman v. 
Patterson, 121 Utah 221, 137, P. 2d 911 (1952). The 
rule is summarized in 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §1503, 
pp. 867-71, as follows: 
When a party relies, in the trial 
court, on a certain ground, or theory, 
of action or defense, he is bound thereby 
and will not be allowed, in the appellant 
court, to assume or adopt any position 
or attitude which is inconsistent 
therewith, or to shift, change, or abandon 
his theory or contentions, nor will he 
be heard to question the propriety 
or validity of his course in that 
behalf, nor may he enlarge his theory 
of recovery. The rule applies to a 
party who has tried his case wholly 
or in part on a certain theory. 
This general rule is for the purpose 
of the orderly administration and 
attainment of justice; its enforcement 
promotes consistency of action before 
the courts, and prejudice need not first 
be shown before the courts will enforce 
such rule. 
Appellant submits that Respondent's attack on the 
Trial Court's finding here, although not a direct 
assignment of error, is contrary to this rule. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Laiming that the evidence supports its "judgment", 
Dparently in the hope that by emphasizing the latter 
t can gloss over the irreconcilable inconsistency 
itween it and the Trial Court's factual finding. 
Respondents effort to "harmonize11 the Trial 
>urtTs decision by contradicting its factual finding 
>es not square with the record. The evidence clearly 
ipports the Trial Court's finding that the funds he-
dged to Dai-Ron. Respondent admits (Respondent's 
ief p. 27) there was at least $9,357.50 in the Dai-Ron 
sh account in Chicago on the day the $25,000 wire 
ansfer was made (after deducting the $9,000 margin 
11 issued on its account that day). Assuming, arguendo, 
at the remainder of the $25,000 came from M-S Commodi-
es' funds, its loss would be only $15,642.50, not 
e $25,000 awarded to it by the Trial Court. However, 
ere is ample evidence supporting Judge Croft's con-
jsion that all of the funds were Dai-Ron's. In addition 
s> $18,557.50 shown by Exhibit 58-DC (R. 1238-40; 
132-33, 215) to be in Dai-Ron's cash account on the 
rning of the transfer (March 15, 1971), it also 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Ld have had whatever surplus existed in its equity 
aunt. Respondent's assertion that flthere is njo 
ience that Dal-Ron had any thing in an equity account'1 
Lef p. 26) misses the point. The record is simply 
*nt as to the amount of such balance. If there was 
sgative balance it was M-S's burden to prove it, 
:h it failed to do. As stated in Appellant's 
ling Brief (p. 21) : 
In the absence of such proof, and in 
view of the Trial Court's express finding 
that the $25,000 were Dal-Ronfs funds, this 
Court is entitled. . .to presume that 
Dai-Ron's equity and cash accounts at 
least equalled $25,000 on that date. 
:hermore, the fact that there was a $9,000 margin 
. on the Dal-Ron account on March 15, 1971, does not 
, as Respondent suggests, that its equity position 
ts commodity contracts was zero or negative on 
day. A margin call is issued when the customers 
unt falls below the Exchange's margin requirements, 
though the customer may have substantial equity 
is commodity contracts. In addition, Stoof testi-
that on March 15, 1971, M-S owed $20,000 for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mmissions previously earned by him on commodities 
ntract sales. (R. 1037; A.77.) Under the arrangement 
tween M-S and Dai-Ron, commissions earned by Stoof 
d Mr. Bagley were payable by M-S to Pal-Ron. (R.1037; 
47) Thus, there is ample evidence supporting Judge 
oft's finding that the $25,000 belonged to Dai-Ron. 
Respondent's argument that neither Stoof nor 
meider "intended for there to be a net loss of $25,000 
Dm the Dai-Ron account" as a result of the $25,000 
re transfer (Respondent's Brief p. 27-31) is completely 
naterial. Presumably, if the transaction had gone as 
3 parties intended, the $34,725.50 Dai-Ron check de-
sited into its Segregated Fund Account at Zions would 
re cleared its payor bank and the overdraft on the 
negated Fund Account would have been only $13,505.08 
;tead of the $38,585.08 recovered by Zions in this 
:ion. In its Brief (p. 28), Respondent 
Ltes: 
Therefore, had the $34,725.50 deposit 
been good, the Dai-Ron account would 
not have had a reduction of $25,000. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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his is true. And Zions would have sued for an over-
raft of only $13,505.08, M-S would have claimed no off-
st and Clark Tank Lines would not have been made a 
lird Party Defendant. But the deposit was not good. 
al-Ron's (not M-S Commodities1) account did have a 
!5,000 reduction and this action followed. The 
iestion is not whether the parties "intended" for 
lere to be a "net loss" of $25,000 from the Dai-Ron 
count but whether M-S Commodities, the party claiming 
e offset, suffered any loss by reason of the transfer. 
e Trial Court's finding that the funds belonged to 
hi 
1-Ron clearly means that it did not. 
1/ 
Judge Croft's comments quoted at pp. 28-29 
Respondent's Brief show clearly that he considered 
i "intent" of the parties with respect to the 
msaction. Notwithstanding, he expressly found 
it the funds "belonged to Dai-Ron Enterprises, 
:." The only significance of his remarks con-
ning the parties' intention was to support his 
Lpanion finding that the funds "did not belong 
J. Moroni Stoof, personally. . . . " 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Respondent next asserts that the "net reduction" 
.n the Dai-Ron account caused by the wire transfer 
damaged M-S Commodities. There is not a breath of 
ompetent evidence to support this claim. Respondent 
efers only to an Answer to Interrogatories filed by 
-S Commodities and read into the record during the 
irst day of trial (R. 862) over Appellant's objection 
1/ 
R. 863-64, 1029-30) wherein it is stated that Dal-
on "did not have sufficient funds to cover margin 
alls and the $25,000 which Mr. Stoof was requesting." 
trom this one must assume, at the very least, that 
lere were some funds in Dai-Ron's accounts and M-S, 
10 had the burden of proving its damage, failed to 
itroduce any evidence as to the amount of the in-
jfficiency claimed in the Interrogatory. Nor did any 
:her party offer any such evidence. On the other 
md, there is ample evidence as noted above, (all 
~~~17 
Appellant objected to this evidence on the 
•ound that it was hearsay. Maurie Schneider, who signed 
e Answer to Interrogatories on behalf of M-S Commodi-
.es, did not attend the trial and could not be cross-
:amined on the statements made therein. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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rhich, it should be noted, came from the testimony 
I-S's own agents, Priscilla Secrest, Stoof and 
.ey) from which the Trial Court could reasonably 
ilude that M-S was holding sufficient funds of 
•Ron to cover the $25,000. 
III. THE COUNTERCLAIM JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF M-S COMMODITIES AGAINST 
ZIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE ZIONS 
DID NOTHING FOR WHICH IT IS LEGALLY LIABLE 
EN CONNECTION WITH THE $25,000 WIRE TRANSFER 
Respondent continues its defense of the Trial 
:t!s judgment against it on M-Sfs counterclaim at 
is 31-37 of its Brief where it argues variously 
t (1) it was negligent in disbursing the $25,000 to 
rk Tank Lines, (2) AppellantTs agents induced it 
3e negligent and (3) Appellant's reliance on the 
form Fiduciary Act is misplaced. 
Appellant agrees with Respondent's statements 
spondent's Brief pp. 32-33) that its "negligence" 
found by the Trial Court to lie in the fact that 
failed to "deliver" the funds to Dal-Ron in the form 
a check made payable to Dal-Ron. This omission does 
, however, establish Respondent's negligence under Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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:he facts of this case. The simple, uncontroverted 
act is that Respondent disbursed the Dai-Ron funds 
recisely in the manner and to the person directed by 
al-Ronfs representative (and concerning whom it had, 
onversely, no knowledge that he was in any way associ-
ted with Clark Tank Lines). Appellant refers the 
ourt to its arguments under Point II of its Opening 
rief on this matter and to its additional arguments 
rider Points III and IV thereof on the general 
uestion of Respondent's negligence. One statement 
i Respondent's Brief deserves comment. In its 
pening Brief, Appellant noted that the instruction 
Lven to Respondent on the Advice of Credit which 
ransferred the $25,000 directed it only to "credit" 
il-Ron with the funds and did not preclude it from 
lereafter disbursing them as directed by Dal-Ronfs 
resident (Stoof). Respondent claims Dai-Ron had no 
xount to which the funds could be "credited11 and notes 
Respondent's Brief p. 32) the testimony of its 
iployee, Karen Christensen, that the $25,000 was 
nt to Respondent "for delivery to Dai-Ron". This 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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nstruction of the evidence only strenghtens Appellant's 
gument that Respondent did not disobey the instruction 
disbursing the funds instead of "crediting" them 
Dai-Ron's 'Account". As Respondent states (Ibid.), 




 JL2. Dal~RQflfT which it clearly did by disbursing 
am in accordance with instructions given to it 
Dal-Ronfs President. 
Respondent's argument (Respondent's Brief pp. 
-35) that Appellant's agents induced it to act "neg-
jently" presumably is made in response to Point III 
Appellant's Opening Brief wherein Appellant urges 
it Respondent was entitled to follow the instructions 
teeming the distribution of the funds given to it by 
Commodities own agents, Stoof and Betty Curtis, 
pondent's argument here demonstrates the fuzziness 
its entire thinking on the question of its liability 
M-S on the latter's counterclaim. The activities 
Appellant's agents admittedly are pertinant on the 
ue of its liability to Respondent on the latter's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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lird Party Complaint, But they have absolutely 
Dthing to do with Respondent's liability to M-S on 
le counterclaim, which liability must be established 
Lrst, as a basis for Respondent's claim against 
ppellant on the Third Party Complaint. If Respondent 
2ted in a way for which it is legally liability to M-S, 
t does not matter who may have induced or caused it 
D so act unless it was so induced by M-S's own agents, 
i xtfhich case M-S must be barred from any recovery. 
lis, in fact, is the case here, as Appellant has 
Kplained under Point III of its Opening Brief. Stoof 
as M-S's local Branch Manager and was not even known by 
le Zions1 employees involved in disbursing the funds 
o be employed by Clark Tank Lines. Betty Curtis was 
nployed only by M-S on the day in question. They 
rranged for the funds to be sent from M-S's Chicago 
ank to Respondent and instructed Respondent to dis-
urse the funds to Craig Maddux in a check made 
ayable to Clearfield State Bank. Respondent's failure 
o distinguish between the evidence pertinent only to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
the counterclaim and that which is material only to 
the third party action demonstrates its desire to 
>reserve, at any cost, the lower court's judgment 
igainst it in order to han on to its third party 
judgment against Appellant. 
Respondent's contention that Appellant's 
•eliance upon the Uniform Fiduciary Act is "misplaced", 
ecause Respondent was given "specific instructions as 
o the disbursal of the money and did not follow 
hem" (Respondent's Brief p. 36), ignores the fact 
hat the instructions concerning such disbursal were 
iven to Respondent by Stoof, the fiduciary of both 
he transferor of the funds (M-S Commodities) and 
he designated recipient (Dai-Ron). The evidence is 
lear that Karen Christensen released the funds upon 
tooffs instruction because she knew he was associated 
ith both M-S and Dai-Ron. (R. 653, 1196, 1203-04; 
. 115, 122-23, 237) The Trial Court so found: 
He [Maddux] indicated to Karen Christensen, 
the wire transfer clerk at the Bank, that 
the check should be made payable to Clear-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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field State Bank, which instruction pre-
viously had been given to Karen Christen-
sen by J. Moroni Stoof, whom she knew to 
be associated with both M-S and Dai-Ron. 
(R. 653; A.237) 
There is no evidence that Christensen knew Stoof 
to be associated with Clark Tank Lines in any manner. 
Jnder the statute, the Bank is protected from liability 
to M-S for ordinary negligence in disbursing funds to 
I^-S?s fiduciary regardless of the use thereafter made 
oi the funds by him. The Court erred in finding lia-
bility solely on the basis of ordinary negligence. 
IV THE THIRD PARTY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST CLARK TANK LINES IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY ANY FINDING OF ACTIONABLE 
WRONG BY CLARK VIS-A-VIS ZIONS BANK 
The balance of Respondent's Brief is devoted to 
irgunent urging this Court to sustain its Third Party 
judgment against Appellant, Respondent contends that 
:his judgment is proper "upon principles of fairness and 
equity" because Appellant is "unjustly benefited" by 
:he receipt of the funds as a result of the actions 
>f its own agents, Stoof and Maddux. 
Respondent's appeal to "principles of fairness Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and equity" is indeed astounding in this instance. 
Three parties (Respondent, M-S and Appellant) are here 
contending a right to recover or retain the $25,000. 
Is Respondent claiming that it is more fair for M-S 
to recover these funds, which belonged to Dal-Ron, than 
for them to be retained by Appellant, who received them 
in payment of a lawful debt? Is Respondent claiming 
that it has a more equitable right to these funds than 
Appellant? If so, upon what basis? It must be remembered 
that Respondent^ claim against Appellant is made only 
by third party pleading. It has no claim for the 
funds against Appellant unless it is required to pay 
them to M-S on the latterfs counterclaim. M-S failed 
to prove that it suffered any loss of its own funds 
by reason of the transaction. There is no evidence 
that it was required to or that it did reimburse Dal-Ron 
or anyone else for the money. Appellant, on the other 
hand, proved that Maddux received the funds from Stoof 
because Stoof was indebted to Appellant in the known 
amount of $50,000 on March 15, 1971. Indeed, to respond 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to Respondent's contention that not a ITscintilla 
of evidence" shows that the $25,000 ever belonged to 
Appellant (Respondent's Brief, p. 25), the record shows 
that, unknown to Appellant, Stoof was on that day in-
debted to it in the approximate amount of $593,000 as 
a result of a series of embezzlements from Appellant 
(R. 1177-78; A. 104-05) much of which funds were invested 
by him in the Commodities Market through M-S Commodities. 
Appellant can hardly be said to be "unjustly benefited" 
or "unjustly enriched" by receiving $25,000 from 
Stoof under such facts. 
Appellant recognizes that the Trial Court stated 
it awareness of the various roles occupied by Stoof in 
this case and that on March 15, 1971, Stoof held 
agency positionswithM-S, Dai-Ron and Appellant. In 
its Opening Brief (particularly under Points II, III, 
V and VIII thereof) Appellant has stated its reasons 
for urging that the Trial Court nevertheless committed 
error in awarding judgment to M-S on its Counterclaim. 
M-S simply cannot escape the legal consequences of the 
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facts, as found by the Trial Court, that Stoof and 
Betty Curtis instructed Respondent how to disburse the 
funds (i.e., by a check payable to Clearfield State 
Bank) and to whom it should deliver the check (i.e., 
to Craig Maddux). M-S is not aided by the fact that 
StoofTs purpose was to obtain the funds to repay his 
debt to Appellant and that he arranged to have the 
money picked up at Zions Bank by another Clark Tank 
Lines employee (Maddux). In this sense, the Trial Court's 
statement that Appellant's employees "caused all of 
this mess" (R. 1350; A.202) is not supported by the 
evidence. Karen Christensen released the funds to 
Maddux solely because she had been instructed to do so 
by Stoof and Betty Curtis. (R. 653, 1125, 1137-38, 
1156, 1196; A. 83-84, 93-94, 96, 237.) She had no 
knowledge that Stoof was in any way associated with 
Clark Tank Lines, but knew he was the Salt Lake repre-
sentative for M-S and that he was connected with the 
Dai-Ron accounta (R. 653, 1196, 1203-04; A. 115, 
122-23, 237) Betty Curtis was employed only by M-S 
during the period relevant here. (R. 818; A. 7-8) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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As far as Christensen was concerned, Appellantfs 
employees didn't cause her to do anything. Stoof 
was clearly wearing his M-S and Dal-Ronfs "hats" 
in all of his contacts with Christensen in this matter. 
Curtis wore only the M-S hat. 
In entering its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the Trial Court expressly refused to find that 
Appellant obtained the $25,000 from Zions by "deceit, 
trickery, and/or misrepresentation" or by reason of 
"fraud." (See Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 40-41.) 
Appellant recognizes that the Trial Court stated that 
Stoof and Maddux "acted together" on behalf of 
Appellant in obtaining the funds (R. 658; A.242) and 
that Appellant "least of all" was entitled to them. 
(R. 1350; A.202) However, the Court's judgment 
against Appellant must be based on some conclusion that 
it committed a legally actionable wrong. No such 
finding or conclusion was made by the Trial Court. 
Concerted action is not inherently wrongful and unless 
Stoof and Maddux were engaged in some form of mis-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Zions Bank, there is no basis for the Third Party 
Judgment. 
Appellant respectfully urges the Court to re-
verse the judgments herein appealed from and to award 
Appellant its costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD J. OCKEY, of 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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